Year 3 after the Hijrah · 3 AH (625 CE) · year 16 of prophethood

Uḥud

Preparation, reversal at , care for the wounded and the response afterward.

His age
55
Where
Uḥud
Counted as
3 AH

The account

This lesson follows the third Madinan year in ar-Raḥīq al-Makhtūm: patrols and threats before Uḥud, Quraysh's preparations, consultation in Madinah, the battle and its aftermath. Earlier events are not repeated as though they happened again. Banū Qaynuqāʿ, the Sawīq raid and the reported plot by ʿUmayr ibn Wahb رضي الله عنه belong to the preceding year's account. The longer historical descriptions are distinguished from supporting Ṣaḥīḥ reports, and the Qur'anic discussion is offered as revelation context rather than proof that every named verse was revealed on the battlefield.

The book places the Dhū Amr expedition in Muḥarram after reports that Banū Thaʿlabah and Banū Muḥārib were gathering against Madinah. It gives about four hundred and fifty men under the Prophet ﷺ. Those being sought dispersed into the hills, and no battle took place. The force camped at the watering place before returning. This was one of several movements where a reported threat led to a patrol rather than a pitched battle. The historical numbers explain the account's scale; they are not all independently verified by a Ṣaḥīḥ report.

Kaʿb ibn al-Ashraf is described in the book as a wealthy poet who travelled to Makkah after Badr and encouraged opposition to the Muslims, then produced verses targeting Muslim women. Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī records the Prophet ﷺ asking who would deal with him because he had harmed Allah and His Messenger ﷺ. Muḥammad ibn Maslamah رضي الله عنه volunteered and obtained permission to speak in a way that would enable the plan. The hadith supports the operation; the book supplies additional background that must not all be assigned the same evidential strength.

Muḥammad ibn Maslamah رضي الله عنه and the men with him approached Kaʿb under a pretext involving a loan and security for it. The report describes a night meeting and the planned killing. The source adds that al-Ḥārith ibn Aws رضي الله عنه was wounded and treated afterward. The lesson does not reproduce every dramatic exchange or describe the operation as a general permission for private violence. It was a specific action under the Prophet's ﷺ authority, not collective blame against Kaʿb's wider religious community.

Another patrol went to Buḥrān, in the region of al-Furuʿ, with about three hundred men according to the book. The source places it in Rabīʿ ath-Thānī and records no fighting. In Jumādā ath-Thāniyah, Zayd ibn Ḥārithah رضي الله عنه led an interception at al-Qaradah after Quraysh sought a different trade route through Najd toward Iraq. The book describes captured caravan property and the setting aside of a fifth. These movements explain the continuing pressure around commerce and roads before Uḥud, rather than suggesting that the battle arrived without an intervening history.

Quraysh prepared a new army, using profits associated with the caravan that had escaped before Badr. The historical account gives about three thousand men, including two hundred cavalry and many with armour. Abū Sufyān رضي الله عنه led them before his acceptance of Islam. Women accompanied the army to encourage its fighters. Waḥshī رضي الله عنه, also not yet Muslim, was promised freedom by his owner for killing Ḥamzah رضي الله عنه. These circumstances are kept separate from the later status of people who eventually accepted Islam.

The book describes information reaching Madinah about Quraysh's advance and preparations for guarding the city. The threat was no longer an isolated caravan or small raiding party. A large army had travelled toward the homes of the believers. The Prophet ﷺ consulted the people rather than treating the choice of battlefield as a decision without consequences for them. The discussion that followed is part of the historical account of Uḥud; it should be read alongside the later Qur'anic review, not replaced by a single moral slogan.

The Prophet ﷺ preferred a defence within Madinah, where the houses and lanes could be used against the attackers. Others wanted to go out, including men who had missed Badr. The source also recounts a dream involving cattle, a damaged sword and protective armour, understood in relation to losses and Madinah's defence. Dreams in this account are not instructions for learners to predict later events. The practical decision remained consultation about how to meet the approaching army and protect the community.

After the decision to march out, the Prophet ﷺ prepared and put on his armour. Some who had pressed for an open battle regretted having pushed their preference and offered to leave the choice to him. The book reports that he ﷺ would not put aside the armour before the matter was decided. This wording belongs to the sīrah account being followed, not an unlabelled quotation from the archers' Ṣaḥīḥ report. The account shows a decision carried into action after consultation, rather than a battle entered without preparation.

About a thousand men initially set out, according to the source. The book describes the organisation of the force and the return of some younger boys who were not permitted to fight. Rāfiʿ ibn Khadīj رضي الله عنه was allowed because of his skill with the bow, and Samurah ibn Jundub رضي الله عنه after showing his strength in wrestling. These details belong to the historical preparation account. They should not be used to present battle as a children's adventure; the approaching conflict threatened lives and homes.

The march also exposed division within the city. ʿAbdullāh ibn Ubayy withdrew with about three hundred men, leaving roughly seven hundred to continue. ʿAbdullāh ibn ʿAmr ibn Ḥarām رضي الله عنه urged the withdrawing group to return, but they did not. The source connects this moment with the anxiety of Banū Salimah and Banū Ḥārithah. Sūrat Āl ʿImrān discusses two groups who nearly lost heart while Allah remained their protector. That connection is kept as the source's explanation of the passage, not a precise timestamp for its revelation.

When news reached Madinah, the Prophet ﷺ called a council. His own preference was to defend the city from within its houses and lanes, but after consultation the majority, including younger companions eager to meet the enemy as they had at Badr, argued for marching out to meet Quraysh in open ground. Once the Prophet ﷺ had dressed in his armour, he would not reverse the decision even when some of those who had pressed him then wished to withdraw their request; he said it did not become a Prophet to lay down his armour once he had put it on until Allah decided between him and the enemy.

The Prophet ﷺ organised roughly a thousand men into three units under Muṣʿab ibn ʿUmayr رضي الله عنه, Usayd ibn Ḥuḍayr رضي الله عنه, and al-Ḥubāb ibn al-Mundhir رضي الله عنه, and left Ibn Umm Maktūm رضي الله عنه to lead prayers in Madinah. On the march, a group of allied Jews from Khazraj's circle offered to fight alongside the Muslims; the Prophet ﷺ declined their help because they had not entered Islam, saying he would not seek the support of disbelievers against other disbelievers.

As the army approached Uḥud, ʿAbdullāh ibn Ubayy withdrew with about a third of the force, roughly three hundred men, claiming his advice had been rejected. ʿAbdullāh ibn ʿAmr ibn Ḥarām رضي الله عنه, father of Jābir ibn ʿAbdullāh رضي الله عنه, followed and urged them to return and at least help defend the camp, but they refused, leaving about seven hundred men to continue to Uḥud.

The Prophet ﷺ positioned fifty archers under ʿAbdullāh ibn Jubayr رضي الله عنه on a hill at the Muslim army's flank, giving explicit and repeated instructions, preserved in more than one version including one recorded by al-Bukhārī, that they were to hold their position whether the battle went for the Muslims or against them, and not to leave until ordered. He positioned the rest of the army with the mountain of Uḥud at its back for protection.

When the fighting began, the standard-bearers of Banū ʿAbd ad-Dār on the Makkan side fell one after another in single combat and in the general engagement; az-Zubayr ibn al-ʿAwwām رضي الله عنه killed the first standard-bearer, and Ḥamzah رضي الله عنه fought prominently in the opening phase of the battle. The Muslim advance pushed the Makkan line back, and several companions, including al-Barāʾ ibn ʿĀzib رضي الله عنه, later described seeing the enemy's women fleeing in the confusion.

Waḥshī رضي الله عنه later described how he killed Ḥamzah رضي الله عنه with a spear while he was still fighting for Quraysh. His own account is preserved in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī 4072, not Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim 1791. The latter reports the Prophet's ﷺ injuries at Uḥud. This distinction matters: a reference must support the event to which it is attached. The later testimony is not evidence that Waḥshī رضي الله عنه was Muslim during the battle; the lesson keeps his action at Uḥud separate from his eventual acceptance of Islam.

Seeing the apparent Muslim success and the enemy fleeing, most of the fifty archers, forty according to the account, left their position for the spoils of war despite ʿAbdullāh ibn Jubayr's رضي الله عنه warning and the Prophet's ﷺ earlier order; only he and nine men remained in place. Khālid ibn al-Walīd رضي الله عنه, still fighting for Quraysh at this stage, used the gap to bring his cavalry around behind the Muslim lines.

The sudden attack from the rear reversed the course of the battle. The Muslim ranks were thrown into disorder, and a rumour spread across the field that the Prophet ﷺ had been killed, which caused some fighters to lose heart. It should be stated plainly that although this was a severe reversal, it was not a massacre of the whole army; of the roughly seven hundred Muslims who had reached Uḥud, about seventy were killed, and the greater number survived the day.

The Prophet ﷺ was wounded during the renewed attack. Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim 1791 reports his damaged tooth and head wound. Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī 4075 describes Fāṭimah رضي الله عنها washing the blood while ʿAlī رضي الله عنه poured water. When water increased the bleeding, a piece of mat was burnt and its ashes used on the wound. The lesson does not attach the statement about forgiving an ignorant people to this episode: that wording comes from a separate report describing a prophet, not proof of what the Prophet ﷺ said at Uḥud.

Companions including Abū Bakr رضي الله عنه, ʿUmar رضي الله عنه, ʿAlī رضي الله عنه, Ṭalḥah رضي الله عنه ibn ʿUbaydullāh, and Saʿd ibn Abī Waqqāṣ رضي الله عنه fought to protect the Prophet ﷺ in this critical period; Ṭalḥah رضي الله عنه is reported to have shielded him with his own hand and was wounded doing so. The Prophet ﷺ and the remaining fighters withdrew up the slope of Uḥud to a defensible position, ending the enemy's assault.

In the aftermath, some of the Makkans mutilated a number of the Muslim dead, a specific and widely reported act rather than something every participant did; reports describe Hamzah's رضي الله عنه body among those mutilated. These actions, along with Quraysh's earlier failure to press the advantage further into Madinah, left both sides changed by what had happened without Quraysh achieving a decisive victory.

The dead were buried at Uḥud. Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī records the martyrs being buried without washing and two men placed in one grave, with the one who knew more Qur'an placed first. The book describes the losses of Ḥamzah رضي الله عنه, Muṣʿab ibn ʿUmayr رضي الله عنه and others, and the difficulty of finding enough cloth for burial. For Muṣʿab رضي الله عنه, covering his head left his feet exposed, so grass was used over them. These were real deaths and limited resources, not a battle reduced to a lesson about a tactical mistake.

The next day, the Prophet ﷺ called those who had fought at Uḥud to go out toward Ḥamrāʾ al-Asad despite their wounds. The source records an exception for Jābir ibn ʿAbdullāh رضي الله عنه, who had stayed behind to care for his sisters at his father's request. The force remained outside Madinah while Quraysh considered whether to return. The historical account describes messages that discouraged that return, and Quraysh continued toward Makkah. This follow-up was not another major battle, but belongs to how the community responded after Uḥud.

Sūrat Āl ʿImrān devotes around sixty verses to reviewing the battle, addressing the causes of the reversal directly, including disagreement and the desire among some for worldly gain, while also distinguishing sincere believers from hypocrites and consoling the community. The year's events, from the pre-Uḥud operations through the battle and its aftermath, taught the young Muslim community that obedience to clear instructions, and the willingness to face a setback honestly rather than deny it, mattered as much as courage itself.

The Qur'an alongside this year

People in this year

Answer from memory